Introduction
This paper is an attempt to consider the role of the military in Nigeria's democratic transitions. The paper has one major thrust -an in-depth analysis of military role in democratic transitions in Nigeria -the fundamental question, however, is: can the military ever be expected or assumed to play any major role in building democracy? The reality on the ground in Africa is that the military as an institution has never been completely immune from politics and the role of nation-building. However, whether they have been doing that perfectly or not is another question entirely which this paper shall address.
The extant literature on civil-military relations generally is far from being optimistic that the military can discharge that kind of function creditably. Nonetheless, perhaps by sheer providence, they have been prominent both in political transitions and nation-building in Africa. It is against this backdrop of both pessimism and optimism that necessitated this caption an 'oxymoron'-a figure of speech which depicts the contradictory compatibility in terms of civil-military relations in Nigeria.
It is important to note that Nigeria's democratization march has been a chequered one. Ben Nwabueze identified five different phases of Nigeria's democratization bid, namely: "era of colonial autocracy and absolutism, emergence of constitutional democracy and the return of autocracy and absolutism under military government, restoration of constitutional democracy and second coming of military autocracy and absolutism". For proper empirical analysis, this paper has been divided into a number of sections. Following an introductory overview, the second part of the paper forms its theoretical and conceptual framework. It explicates the concepts of democratic consolidation while juxtaposing both the organizational characters of the military with the attributes of democracy bringing out the salient facts of the incapability of the military to discharge such functions. The third section review modes of democratic transition in Africa. Part four attempts a critical review of the military and democratic transitions in Nigeria beginning with the 1975-1979 experiment, 1985-1993, 1993-1998 and the shortest transition program of General Abdulsalam Abubakar (1998 Abubakar ( -1999 , that gave birth to the present democratic experiment. The paper eventually appreciates the role of the military in political transitions in Nigeria despite the inherent contradictions to democratic consolidation in the country. We now proceed to both theoretical and conceptual frameworks. normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty." 8 This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performs. But most of all and most urgently, it requires political institutionalization. In a nutshell, Whitehead believes that democracy can best be said to be sustained or consolidated only when we have good reason(s) to believe that it is capable of withstanding pressure or shocks without abandoning the electoral process or the political freedom on which it depends, including those of the dissent and the opposition. Definitely, this will also require a depth of institutionalization reaching beyond the electoral process itself. 9 From the same perspective, Przeworski 10 is of the view that democracy is consolidated when the major political players recognize sufficient common interest in establishing electoral procedures and subsequently see that their interest in keeping to the rules of the game outweighs the costs to them of their being underpinned, rather than out of any principled commitment to democratic norms and canons.
Exploring the nexus between good governance and democratic consolidation, the UNDP in its 1997 reports, came up with a catalogue of what it takes to sustain democracy, which includes: popular participation, democratic sustenance, transparency and promotion of gender balance and service-oriented governance amongst others.
11
The question is: How do we identify a 'consolidated democracy' when we see one? 12 No doubt, a variety of different criteria are proposed rather than mere definitions that their extension may not serve us any useful purpose. One is the 'two-election' test, or more properly, the 'transfer of power' test. However, democracy is consolidated when a government that has itself been elected in a free and fair contest is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the result. The point of this criterion is that it is not winning office that really matters, but losing it and accepting the verdict, because this 8 Larry Diamond, 1995 9 L. Whitehead, "The Consolidation of fragile Democracies" in Democracy in the Americas; Stopping the Pendulum, Robert A. Pastor, ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989 Limited, 2006), pp. 6-7. Betham, p. 160 demonstrates that powerful players and their social backers are prepared to put respect for the rules of the game above the continuation of their power.
13
This criterion is perhaps the greatest hurdle to Nigeria's democratization bid all along. In an high flung editorial comment in commemoration of Nigeria's three years of democracy, a national daily noted that "… the truth is that, up till now, democracy in Nigeria has never survived the 'second' election test, which is central to the idea of democratic consolidation."
14
It was the crisis that resulted from the 'second' election in the first republic that truncated it. Same goes for the second republic too. The 2003 civilian transition did not go without a lot of hue and cry from the opposition parties, because the election was assumed to be badly rigged.
However, as Betham would have us believe, the problem with this criterion is that it is perfectly possible to have an electoral system that meets certain minimum democratic standards, but where such a transfer of power simply does not take place, because the electorate goes on voting for the same party (the so-called 'dominant party' model). Such has been Botswana's lot since independence and such were Japan's and Italy's for nearly 50 years. Are we to say that these were not consolidated democracies simply because no transfer of power took place? The recent change of government in Italy and Japan by the electorate suggests that they were indeed consolidated years back.
For this reason, some writers favour a simple longevity or generation test: 20 years, say, of regular competitive elections are sufficient to judge a democracy's consolidation, even without a change of ruling party, since habituation to the electoral process would make any alternative method for appointing rulers unthinkable. This criterion, in turn, has its own difficulties. It is well known that the longer the same party remains in power, the more indistinguishable it becomes from the state apparatus on the one side and powerful economic interests on the other. Furthermore, it is not in itself a good predictor of how a system will behave in the future. In a nutshell, a 13 Linz Juan, "Transitions to Democracy," The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1990 Republic (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1985) . democracy can best be said to be consolidated when we have good reason to believe that it is capable of withstanding pressures or shocks without abandoning the electoral process or the political freedoms on which it depends, including those of dissent and opposition. This will require a depth of institutionalization reaching beyond the electoral process itself.
15
The foregoing has demonstrated that the sustainability of democracy is a product of many factors or conditions operating together. No one condition on its own will be either necessary or sufficient, but an accumulation of facilitating conditions can be expected to enhance the prospects for the survival of electoral democracy. The projectdemocratic consolidation -is more difficult in some circumstances than others and faces much more formidable obstacles in some countries than others. It is a task in the social sciences to identify these circumstances and subject them to comparative analysis.
It is unequivocally important to discern the fact that the concept of democratic consolidation has the problems of homonymity (one word meaning many things). Inimical to theory building and the accumulation of knowledge, it even frustrates such elementary operations as case classification. As matters now stands, the concept's classificatory utility is close to zero; its boundaries are fuzzy and fluid. As Kotowski, says about the concept of revolution, "if scholars do not attach the same meaning to the concept they can at least specify which meaning they mean," 16 rather than using the term in the ambiguous and inconsistent way, we should attach one clear meaning to it.
Sartori also declared, different things should have different names."
17
For the purposes of this paper therefore, democratic consolidation means the capacity of the polity to nurture and sustain democratic values over a very long time, with little or no threat of dissolution of the democratic experiment in all its ramifications and in the African context with visible dividends of democracy in terms of improving the lots of the citizenry within which they may not be a catalyst to democratic sustenance. Having conceptualized democratic consolidation without necessarily being definitional, we now turn to organizational character of the military vis-à-vis democracy.
15 Whitehead, 1989. 16 
Organizational Character of the Military vis-a-vis Democracy
The 
18
Organization is central to effective performance of the military function.
According to Finer, "a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status and a monopoly of arms" are the three advantages which the armed forces have over civilian organizations.
19
He asserts further that even where the army is poorly organized or maintained; it is still highly structured than any civilian group. The army is arranged in a pyramid of authority. The hierarchical structure, like the characteristics of centralization derives from the army's basic imperatives to fight as a unit, "an army should have but one chief, a greater number is detrimental", argues Adekanye quoting Machiavelli.
21
It must have a supreme directing command, hence centralization. The command must transmit its orders from the highest to lowest ranks, hence the requirement of hierarchy. Following from centralization of command in the pyramid structure, obligation to obedience and discipline, the condition of unquestioning obedience is manifested by the depersonalization of the soldier. The unity, technical competence, professional identity and patriotic values of military organizations in new states place them in sharp contrast to the civilian sector which is often badly divided and technological backward. 24 In the same vein, Dudley, identifying predisposing factors of the military to coups noted such superior qualities of the military over the civilians to include variables as:
The structure and composition of the armed forces, taking into account the possibilities for mobility within the military; the commitment to, or degree of professionalism of, armed forces personnel; and the prevailing ideology held by, or normative orientation of, the military.
25
Politically too, moral prestige is an advantage to the military. These virtues are associated with the soldiers' choice of career. Not always are these virtues fully respected, but most of the times and in many countries, traits like courage and discipline cum self-sacrifice and patriotism, identified with the soldier, makes it admired.
26
Writing on the features of the military, Julius Ihonvbere argues that the army is conceived as an ideal type characterized by certain organizational features. He pointed to the fact that:
The officers while in training, have imbibed certain qualities such as puritanical ethic, professionalism, dedication, nationalistic ethos and an in-group cohesion which will make them act in unity and decisively in the execution of military or political functions. The skills acquired in training, coupled with a high sense of national identity, managerial ability, all go to explain the unity, strength and decisiveness of the military in the emerging states and creates a 'competence gap' between the military and other sectors of the society. 27 In view of the foregoing, military rule is authoritarian perhaps, because of the character of the military whose significant elements are command and obedience, supra-individuality and confrontation rather than compromise. It is these elements which constitute the military value system. It is also this 'military frame of mind,' to use Martin Dent's apt phrase, 
Modes of Democratic Transition
In the extant literature on transition, generally, two broad meanings are associated with democratic transitions in Africa. In one sense, transition encompasses a fundamental or qualitative change in the state of being of the relevant entity, as for example, the revolutionary overturning of prevailing structures and relationships in a society and their replacement with a significantly new and usually qualitatively higher network of ideas and symbols. Transition, in this sense, constitutes an "epoch defining patterns. 32 The two broad perspectives on transition examined above imply differences in scope and intensity. They generates lively intellectual discussion as to how comprehensively a transition package permeates and transforms (or can permeate and transform) all aspects of organized life in the society. The point that needs to be made and emphasized in this view is that although the two broad conceptions of transition can be distinguished qualitatively, neither is mutually exclusive, precisely since society itself is usually in a state of constant flux. Thus, the most revolutionary program of transition could involve some elements of grafting old and new values and structure.
Whether or not old values are replicated and strengthened or neutralized and eliminated in the new dispensation will depend, in part, on the resilience of old patterns, and also on popular perceptions of their relevance and efficiency.
More importantly, transition must be concerned with political stability defined as the increasing capacity of designated institutions to resolve political questions through accepted or acceptable interval, routine, and procedure without recourse to extrainstitutional means. Stable political systems are characterized not so much by limitless opportunities for wants of satisfaction as by a political disposition that allows "a hundred flowers to bloom" and encourages conflicting perspectives of the social order to be reconciled with one another. Transition processes, then, must of necessity 31 J.M. Amoda, "Transition and Structural Adjustments," Presidential Address delivered at the 14th annual Conference of the Nigeria Political Science Association, Zaria, (May 17-21, 1987) . 32 Omo Omoruyi, "The Reform Civil Service in the Transition Period and Beyond," Centre for Democratic Studies Publication, Abuja, 1992, pp.1-2 encompass the processes of creating political institutions, such as political parties, electoral management body and of linking these institutions up in a system of relationship with one another with the environments, and of inducing members of the relevant social system to imbibe the behavioural patterns thrown up by the framework.
33
It is pertinent to note that there are three main types of political disengagements or transitions. Nigeria, 1966 -1979 (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1985 . Ikpeme by the unregistered Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) to restrain the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from holding the election; the judge ruled that "the election be deferred until the substantive suit is determined." 44 It was, however, impossible for NEC to defer an election which was less than 48 hours away because of the possible political crisis that might follow. Justifying the wisdom in NEC's decision to continue with the election, a top government functionary was reported to have stated inter alia: "definitely we are going ahead with the election. It was very embarrassing for us. We respect the Judiciary but the political turmoil that would arise from the cancellation of the election would be considerable." In the light of the current development, the commission had in deference to the court injunction and other action pending in court decided to stay action on all matters pertaining to the presidential election until further notice. 49 With the stalemate, the leader of ABN, Chief Arthur Nzeribe, called for the cancellation of the election on the ground that "the so-called election was a fraud, a flop, illegal, unconstitutional and undemocratic. Be that as it may, the annulment of the election result was especially provocative to the South Western part of the country. In view of the political volatility of the Yoruba region, civil violence in the South Western states provoked by electoral fraud and political exclusion previously contributed to the breakdown of the first and second republics. Southern resentment over Abiola's rebuff also threatened to create fissures within the military, raising the specter of wider civil conflict and state collapse. In his official reaction to the annulment, Chief M.K.O. Abiola was quoted as saying: 51 Tempo, September 27, 1993, Lagos. 52 TSM, July 11, 1993, Lagos. 53 Ibid. 54 Newswatch, op. cit…1993, Lagos I might embark on the programme of civil disobedience in the country. If those who make the law disobey the law, why I obey it? There is a limit to the authenticity one could expect from a military ruler who is obviously anxious to hang on to power. As a ploy to buy both time and legitimacy, his administration instituted the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), rather than a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) that he promised ab initio on June 24 th , 1994. While both SNC and NCC do not mean the same thing in terms of power (for the differences between a constitutional conference and a Sovereign National Conference. 59 Eventually, the conference was opposed by a large section of the pro-democracy movement which among other actions, mobilized people to boycott the selection of delegates. This resulted in a low voter turnout. It is on record that throughout the country about a total number of 300,000 voters voted at the delegate election to elect 273 delegates. Given the controversial background of its setting up, the confab, bereft of legitimacy, credibility and power, whose members were substantially bribed (see,
Freedom Watch, CDHR Monthly, June 1996:1-2) could not but fulfill the role in which it was set up for. It was essentially set up to legitimize the Abacha junta and buy it time.
After fixing January 1996 as the exit date for the regime, the NCC later overturned its resolution by recommending to the regime to relinquish power whenever it so desired! As a matter of fact, the NCC, which was schedule to last for three months eventually, took a whole year.
In spite of its credibility problem, the confab did address critical issues on governance, democracy and the national questions and also proffered solutions to them.
The confab came up with a draft constitution submitted to the government on July 27 th , 1995. Notable among the innovations of the confab was to stabilize the convulsing federation, where a system of rotational presidency, a multi party system, the creation of Federal Character Commission, and a new system of revenue allocation placing emphasis on the derivation principle among other notable exceptions. The Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), the highest decision making body of the junta examined the draft constitution and by many accounts, the military council found it unsatisfactory and threw it open to public debate. Some of the recommendations were the institutionalization of a plural executive comprising President, Vice-President and Prime Minister to facilitate the process of power sharing among the six zones into which the states were grouped, and the limitation of the system of rotational presidency to an experimental period of thirty years. These integrative mechanisms which were innovations of the regime have been well discussed elsewhere too. Some of the hurdles that they needed to cross were 500,000 Naira registration fees, a minimum membership of 40,000 per state and 15,000 in Abuja, administrative organization and executive spread at local, state and federal levels, as well as having a constitution, manifesto and articulation of issues. All these were to be achieved in two months after which the electoral commission undertook a verification exercise, assessed and ranked the parties and recommended only those which scored above 50 percent for registration. The following parties scored highest and were accordingly registered: In what was generally regarded as political rigmarole called transition program,
Gen. Abacha and his cohorts, all the registered political parties which a late politician 64 The Punch, 1998, p. In the same vein, the press tasted the venom of the junta in Abacha's pursuit of self-succession. Media houses were closed at will and journalists tortured, imprisoned and also exterminated. during the Abacha era. In a nutshell, the regime simply unleashed terror on the polity and was at the same time in self-delusion claiming to mid-wife democracy.
General Abubakar's Transition Programme (1999)
Unlike his predecessor, General Abubakar was not interested in succeeding himself. This gave the new transition program legitimacy and acceptance. Though, several demands were made by various pressure groups, three of them stood out. First, the military was asked to transfer power to a democratically constituted government.
Second, a government of National Unity to be headed by the detained winner of the 
Concluding Remarks
From the foregoing, the military in Nigeria has interrupted civil rule too frequently. 
